

have been killed in October alone as Taylor's men advanced. The deaths included those of the nuns from the order of the Adorers of the Blood of Christ, who had only just returned after being evacuated in 1990. The NPFL's initial successes led to significant changes in ECOMOG's stance. Its professed neutrality between the factions has been abandoned, and Nigerian jets bombed NPFL forces after a truce collapsed. ECOMOG forces were increased to 15,000 troops, and there was fierce fighting around Monrovia in late 1992. Parts of the capital in rebel hands were also shelled from Nigerian ships.

In addition to this military re-orientation and enhanced effort, a series of diplomatic moves have been resumed. The aim is to try and curb Taylor, who is seen as the source of the renewed conflict. Although the United Nations is unwilling to get directly involved, on 19 November 1992 the UN Security Council voted 15-0 to approve Resolution 788, which declared an arms embargo for all the warring factions involved in Liberia's civil war.⁶

This is aimed particularly at Taylor, who is dependent upon arms (and fuel) shipments through the port of Buchanan. If an embargo succeeds – and this is unlikely – then the NPFL's fighting strength would be seriously undermined. Arms embargoes are notoriously difficult to enforce, especially in these circumstances, with poorly policed borders and with Taylor's men bartering for supplies. The NPFL may also be receiving

NOTES

1. *Sunday Times*, 1 November 1992.
2. For a discussion of the historical background to contemporary events, see C. Clapham, 'Liberia', in D.B. Cruise O'Brien *et al.*, *Contemporary West African States* (Cambridge University Press, 1989); and J.G. Liebenow, *Liberia: The Quest for Democracy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

support from Libya, as many have alleged. However, ECOMOG has scored some successes. It secured the surrender of Prince Johnson's breakaway faction in October after Taylor's forces overran Johnson's headquarters.

Although the UN resolution was adopted unanimously, some states, such as France, are wary of giving Nigeria too much of a free hand in the conflict. Resolution 788 accordingly also asked the UN Secretary-General to review the embargo periodically, and it was careful about the presumption involved: that the UN could use a regional organisation to promote peace-keeping. Other states, such as the United States, are seeking to reconcile their long-established links with Liberia with their current lack of direct involvement.

Covert American involvement has been alleged, including the use of technical support for the ECOMOG/Nigerian offensive.⁷ However, it seems unlikely that any American involvement will be extensive in the near future. 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia will not be repeated in West Africa. The best that Liberians can hope for is more security and a chance for economic reconstruction in the aftermath of ECOMOG gaining a more effective grip on Liberia. The alternatives – a Taylor victory or continuing civil conflict – are horrific in their implications.

STEPHEN P. RILEY

3. *Independent on Sunday*, 22 November 1992.

4. *Africa Confidential*, 6 November 1992.

5. *The Guardian*, 18 September 1991.

6. *The Guardian*, 21 November 1992; *The Independent*, 21 November 1992.

7. *Africa Confidential*, 20 November 1992; *West Africa*, 30 November 1992.

Kosovo: round one to Serbia

In the last few months the future of Kosovo, the southern region of ex-Yugoslavia dominated by an 85-90 per cent ethnic Albanian population, has moved nearer centre stage in the Balkan crisis. Kosovo forms part of the heartland of medieval Serbia and has an overwhelming hold on the emotions of all Serbs. The Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox church is in Pec, near the Albanian border. But the Albanian majority in Kosovo has always claimed the region as Albanian, and older people remember the time when, under Axis occupation during the 1941-43 period, it formed part of a larger Albania.

The status of Kosovo under Tito varied, with an autonomous region being established while he was still alive under the old 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. There was a subsequent handover of Kosovo to de facto Albanian control, with allegations of widespread expulsion of Serbs and human-rights abuses. There were serious riots and bloodshed in 1981 and 1989 in the Albanian-majority cities, and the subsequent suspension of the limited existing democratic institutions and the imposition of a martial law regime by Belgrade. Serbs also claim that there was substantial fraud and embezzlement of the large Kosovo development fund under the Albanian-dominated regime of Azem Vllasi in the Party in the 1970s and early 1980s. With this background, Kosovo was central to Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in 1987, when he promised to protect local Serbs from the pressures of Albanian nationalism.

Recent international responses to the development of the Kosovo crisis seem mainly influenced by a version of the domino

theory, where war spreads southwards from the more northern areas of the Balkans. This has been particularly reflected in President Bush's statement on the subject, which showed that Kosovo was seen as an appropriate place to 'draw a line in the sand' against Serbian expansionism. The onset of democracy in Albania itself since the disintegration of the one-party state in 1990 and 1991 has facilitated the development of a surprisingly large, effective and well-organised Albanian lobby in Washington, headed by Senator Robert Dole, and its influence is apparent in many American responses to the current situation. There are also a number of former emigres in the United States under Communism who are in important positions in Tirana now and deeply sympathetic to Kosovar aspirations. In Europe, the fact that Kosovo is part and parcel of Serbia, and under Serbian control now, seems to be accepted, however unpalatable it may be. The impression has been created by many American pronouncements that Kosovo is an existing independent country, about to be invaded by an oppressive neighbour.

The arrival of Arkan

The key political event in the recent past in Kosovo was the overwhelming victory in the Serbian elections on 20 December 1992 of Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan, the notorious paramilitary leader who is on the American list of alleged war criminals in Bosnia. Arkan has been received enthusiastically by the Serbian population and has taken undisputed leadership of the Kosovo Serbs, although other extremist groups, such as the Radical Party

of Vojislav Seselj, are also gaining support and developing their local political and military organisations.

The Socialist Party of Mr Milosevic has been largely eclipsed in this movement, particularly in Pristina itself. Paramilitary activities and the training of Serbian irregulars are proceeding apace. A limited amount of 'ethnic cleansing' – forcible expulsion of non-Serbs – has been taking place in some Albanian localities, although so far without much publicity. Both Arkan and the Radical Party believe that the Serbian national question can only be solved by 'cleansing' Kosovo, whereas there is reason to think that the leaders of the army and Socialist Party establishment in Belgrade do not wish to see internal conflict in Kosovo, at least not at this stage. The Bozur organisation run by Bogdan Kecman has been involved with the resettlement of Serbian refugees from the north on Albanian-owned land, although numbers to date are fairly small – hundreds rather than thousands – of people from Bosnia.

The Albanian response

The Albanian leadership in Kosovo under Dr Ibrahim Rugova has been following the same essentially pacifist policy that has characterised its operation since the end of Communism, with appeals for assistance to the international community, emphasis on the Geneva negotiations, attempts to set up an Albanian counter-culture to fight the repression of Albanian education and culture by the martial-law authorities, and a refusal to get drawn into the organisation of any militias, covert arms purchases or Albanian paramilitary groups.

The fact that a 'government-in-exile' has been set up has meant that for much of the time Dr Rugova and the other senior figures are not in Kosovo, and day-to-day leadership in the Albanian cities has passed into other hands. In the main these people are drawn from the numerous unemployed intellectuals in the Albanian community, people of great moral courage but with little experience of politics or military or political organisation. There have been frequent and serious human-rights violations by the Serbian army and Ministry of the Interior paramilitaries, including violent deaths in custody, but so far the Albanians have not attempted to fight back.

There are, none the less, signs of dissatisfaction with the Rugova leadership, particularly among young people in the most militantly nationalist Albanian cities such as Pec and Djakovica. The Rugova leadership has placed great stress on its capacity to extract concessions from the Serbs at the Geneva talks. Its failure to do so, its disappointment at the inability of Milan Panic, Prime Minister of the new, smaller Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

from July to December 1992, to deliver anything on his promises of reform in Kosovo, and the general atmosphere of unreality that increasingly surrounds its idealistic policy in contemporary Balkan conditions must sooner or later call into question the future of the current Kosovar leadership.

The Albanian government in Tirana has been under intense international pressure to place a restraining hand on the Kosovars, but whatever the wishes of the President, Dr Sali Berisha, his position is very difficult. His capacity to affect events is inextricably linked to his armed forces' inability to defend his own country should greater practical involvement in the Kosovo crisis bring an attack from Serbia on Albania. The Albanian army is poorly equipped and disciplined, and the politically inspired purges of senior officers that have taken place this year have produced a weak and inexperienced army leadership.

There is a marked split between those who look to the West and NATO membership and those who look to the Islamic world for re-equipment and financial assistance. Albania's recent decision to become a full member of the Islamic Conference is significant in this respect. Opinion about the merits of a Greater Albania is divided in Tirana, with most northern Ghegs supporting it (at least in principle), while southern Tosks tend to oppose the idea. Dr Berisha's own government is becoming increasingly authoritarian and unpopular and narrowly based, and both the Democratic Alliance, the new centre-right party of Dr Gramoz Pashko, and the Socialist Party are gaining political support. War in Kosovo would seriously destabilise Albania's fragile democracy in fundamental ways. Even if Albania avoids direct military involvement, refugee numbers could place a crippling burden on an impoverished country.

The immediate future

Although Serbia may be stretched elsewhere in the war, in Kosovo the new extremist leadership appears to hold all the aces, at least for the time being. Arkan's presence has brought real fear and anxiety to the Albanian population, and the unreality of the Albanian leaders' policies has been exposed. If war elsewhere weakens Serbia significantly, an Albanian uprising may be on the cards, in the domino theory scenario, but a period of relative 'peace' based on terror seems a more likely outcome of recent events, in the short term at least. But if violence does begin, it may well escalate rapidly, with Serbian interests being tied to a rapid 'cleansing' of vital areas while their firepower and organisation have dominance. In a protracted conflict, Albanian numbers would be likely to tell, as the Serbs are well aware.

JAMES PETTIFER

Honecker and the 'lustration' process

It is generally agreed that Erich Honecker, old East Germany's leader from 1971 to 1989, has little time left on this earth. What is not agreed is just where he should end his days – in the prison of Moabit in Berlin which he knows so well, or in Chile with his family. In Bulgaria, meanwhile, the chief prosecutor is calling for treason charges to be brought against its former Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, who at 81 is a year older than the ailing Honecker, while in the former Soviet Union, as in the former Czechoslovakia and in Poland, there are also calls for former Communist office-holders to be brought to trial. Revenge-seek-

ers of the old Warsaw Pact, to say nothing of those in Albania, are apparently still not satisfied with what history achieved on their behalf – the sweeping away of Communism, as practised until 1989, as a spent force.

The inconclusive and still uncompleted Honecker trial, like the thoughts and threats to his counterparts elsewhere, has thrown up important issues. The first is the demand for retribution, known in Prague by the Latin word 'lustration', which is defined in the Oxford English dictionary as 'purification by expiatory sacrifice'. The second concerns the nature of the former Commu-